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The Affordable Care Act lets young adults stay on their parents’ insurance.  Several 
recent papers use broad age-time difference-in-differences strategies to argue that 
this causes significant health insurance and labor effects.  Using SIPP and CPS data, 
I show that difference-in-differences models over “placebo” dates also produce 
statistically significant “effects” long before ACA implementation, even with 
conservative standard errors and matching adjustments.  This suggests that the 
effects attributed to the ACA could instead reflect dynamics in the age-structure of 
the health insurance and labor markets.  Reducing the age bandwidth yields more 
reliable estimates of the increases in parental and overall insurance coverage.  The 
key problem in this literature is therefore potentially overstating the “effects” of the 
ACA in other dimensions.  (JEL I13, I18, J08) 
Keywords:  health insurance; labor supply; young adults; ACA; placebo tests; 
difference-in-differences 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), signed into law by President Obama on 
March 23, 2010, includes a provision mandating that as of September 23, 2010 most young adults 
must be allowed to stay on their parents’ health insurance until age 26.  Several recent papers study 
the potential effects of this early provision, making important contributions.  Their results are 
intuitive: an increase in the share of individuals with dependent insurance coverage (Akosa Antwi, 
Moriya, and Simon 2013; O’Hara and Brault 2013; Cantor et al. 2012b; Sommers and Kronick 
2012; Sommers et al. 2013, Chua Sommers 2014), a decrease in the uninsurance rate (Akosa 
Antwi, Moriya, and Simon 2013; Mulcahy et al. 2013; O’Hara and Brault 2013; Cantor et al. 
2012b; Sommers and Kronick 2012, Jhamb et al. 2015), a decreased likelihood of delaying or not 
obtaining care due to cost (Sommers et al. 2013, Barbaresco et al. 2015), a decrease in out of 
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pocket costs (Chua and Sommers 2014; Busch et al. 2014) an increased likelihood of having a 
usual source of care (Sommers et al. 2013; Barbaresco et al. 2015), increased labor market 
flexibility (Akosa Antwi, Moriya, and Simon 2013), a drop in share of uninsured ER visits 
(Mulcahey et al. 2013), improved self-reported health (Barbaresco et al. 2015; Carlson et al. 2014), 
increased use of inpatient and mental health resources (Akosa Antwi et al. 2015; Saloner Le Cook 
2014),  an increase in dental coverage (Han et al 2014, Shane and Ayyagari 2014), a decrease in 
emergency room visits (Hernandez-Boussard et al. 2014, Akosa Antwi et al. 2015), and increase 
in premiums for health insurance plans that cover children (Depew and Bailey 2015). 
Econometrically, all of these studies use an age-time difference-in-differences strategy, which 
has also been used to investigate the impact of other health insurance public policies with sharp 
age-cutoffs (e.g. Levine, McKnight, Heep 2011).  Cantor et al. 2012b, using the years 2005-2010, 
compares those age 19-25 to those age 27-30, before and after the 2010 implementation of the 
parental insurance mandate.  Unfortunately, this approach does not satisfy the crucial assumption 
for a difference-in-differences analysis, which is that in the absence of treatment the average 
outcomes for the affected and comparison groups would have followed parallel trends (Bertrand 
et al. 2004, Abadie 2005).  If this condition is not satisfied, the difference in average trends between 
the affected and comparison groups in the affected time period can confound the effect of the 
policy, or even suggest a substantial one when none exists. 
While this critique could be applied to any health insurance public policies with sharp age-
cutoffs (e.g., Medicare, S-CHIP), it is especially applicable to the ACA’s parental mandate because 
of the age-specific labor market turmoil that was occurring during its enactment and 
implementation.  Specifically, over the past few decades, the United States has undergone 
substantial shifts in the structure of its labor force (e.g. see Card and Lemiuex 2000; DiCrecio et 
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al. 2008).  Crucially, these shifts have had differential age effects (e.g. see CBO 2004; Bell and 
Branchflower 2011; O’Higgins 2012), especially during the Great Recession of 2007-2009 (e.g. 
see Lazear and Spletzer 2013; Dunn 2013), contaminating any age-time difference-in-differences 
analysis. 
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
For example, Figure 1 shows the proportion of individuals who are employed, split into those 
affected by the expansion of parental coverage under the ACA (those aged 19-25) and comparison 
age groups not affected (16-18, 27-29).  This data is smoothed over the five months before and 
after the interview month to reduce seasonality. The grey vertical line represents the earliest period 
to include data from the enactment of the federal mandate (October 2009).  The gaps are due to 
missing data between the end of one panel and the start of the next, which are larger due to the 
smoothing. 
If this were an appropriate application of a difference-in-differences strategy, then while the two 
groups would have unequal step changes directly after the implementation, the subsequent trends 
would be the same.  However, the two lines to the right of the vertical line are not parallel, 
suggesting substantial labor market differences between those two groups.  Furthermore, one can 
see in the black boxes that are a many time periods where the two lines have non parallel trends. 
To quantify whether these trends are parallel or not one can regress the probability of being 
employed on month-year-group dummies and then run a joint F-test of whether the coefficients 
for each month-year until enactment (i.e., through February 2010) are equal across groups (e.g., 
January#1997#16-18 & 27-29 = January#1997#19-25, February#1997#16-18 & 27-29 = February 
#1997#19-25).  For 186 months in the full dataset, the F-stat is 1.65*** (p<0.0001), suggesting 
that the two trends are not equal.  Repeating the analysis with quarter-year-group dummies 
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(dropping quarters without 3 months of data) gives an F-stat of 2.45*** (p<0.0001) for 59 quarters, 
which is consistent.1 
[Insert Figure 2 Here] 
Figure 2 shows the same picture for the share of individuals working full-time workers (greater 
than 30 hours/week).  This is arguably more relevant to health insurance coverage since usually 
only full-time employees receive benefits.  Analogous to Figure 1, there are periods in the black 
boxes which have substantially non parallel trends, lending intuition to the claim that young adults 
of different ages are not ex-ante equivalent.  The analogous F-stats are 1.65*** (p<0.0001) and 
2.78*** (p<0.0001). 
Since many young adults have health insurance coverage (or the option of it) through their 
employer, this changing labor market also makes it possible that there were group-specific trends 
in insurance outcomes during the affected time period that would confound any estimates of policy 
impacts. 
For example, if full-time employment growth were lower for the affected age than the 
comparison age due to overall labor market conditions, then these individuals would comparatively 
be losing their own employer sponsored coverage and switching to parental insurance wherever 
possible, independent of any change in mandated insurance availability.  Failing to properly 
control for this would bias estimated effects away from zero as they would include both the impact 
of the mandate and the impact of the differentially changing labor conditions. 
 
1 The regression that generates the coefficients and standard errors for the month-year or quarter-year dummy variables does not cluster standard 
errors at the state level (as all results below do) because there are fewer clusters (51) than conditions tested (186 or 59).  Still, calculating a 
conservative p value from F(186,51) instead of F(186,593938) gives p=0.0186<0.05 and so the result that the trends are not equal is robust.  This 
consistency is the case for all F-statistics in this paper. 
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 It would be extremely challenging to ascertain whether the conclusions in the literature from a 
pre-2010/post-2010 difference-in-differences are the result of the ACA or from differential trends.  
Therefore, in lieu of this I will perform earlier-in-time “placebo” regressions tests on three of the 
most prominent papers on this topic: Sommers and Kronick 2012 (hereafter SK); Cantor et al. 
2012b (Cantor); and Akosa Antwi, Moriya, and Simon 2013 (AMS).2  These papers fostered an 
entire field of research, and provided rapid, positive feedback on the early consequences of the 
ACA.  Their ingenuity did the field a great service. 
My falsification tests will use each paper’s specification, shifting their temporal windows (i.e. 
2005-2010, 2008-2011) backward in time one year at a time.3  Using this approach, I find that the 
differential age-time health insurance and employment effects that appear after the ACA is 
implemented also appear in other time periods, even with a narrower age bandwidth, thus 
undermining the conclusion that these effects are causal outcomes of the ACA.  Rather, they may 
be a consequence of the age-differential changes in labor market in the United States.4 
To attempt to mitigate these differences, I use multiple conservative difference-in-differences 
statistical methods: adjusting for serial correlation (see Bertrand, Duflo, Mullainathan 2004), 
adjusting for intra-group correlation (see Donald and Lang 2007) and also weighing the 
comparison ages to create synthetic control groups (as outlined in Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003).  
While useful in many contexts, none of these methods substantially reduce statistically significant 
placebo results in this paper. 
 
2 AMS (2013) does include limited placebo analysis by randomizing the implementation month between Sept 2008 and Jan 2010, and find no 
significant results beyond expected Type I errors.  Still, trend stability in this short pre-period does not necessarily imply parallel trends in post-
period 
3 These placebo tests are not entirely independent since I am rolling a multi-year window backward one-year at a time.  Still, the time frame 
over which I am running placebo regressions is long enough that this overlap cannot entirely explain the placebo results. 
4 This analysis is in the spirit of Ham, Li, and Shore-Sheppard (2009) which dealt with non-comparable control groups and changes in public 
policy albeit in another context. 
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I also drastically reduce the age bandwidth which does allow me to more reliably test the 
hypotheses in the literature.  However, only some of the health insurance results remain 
statistically significant, whereas none of the labor supply results are.  A Monte Carlo analysis using 
the health insurance results confirms this conclusion.  
Already, due to the influence of earlier version of this paper, two of the most recent working 
papers on this topic (Akosa Antwi et al. 2015 and Barbaresco et al. 2015) include a reduced age 
bandwidth either as their main specification or as a robustness test.  Still, many other new papers 
in the literature continue to use broad age bandwidths with limited if any robustness checks. 
 
II. DATA 
For this analysis I use two public microdata sources: the Annual Social and Economic 
Supplement (ASEC) of the Current Population Survey (aka the “March CPS”) covering years 
1999-20105, and the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), for 1993-20116.  I use 
the March CPS data to replicate SK’s and Cantor’s results, whereas for AMS I replicate using 
SIPP data.7  
 
5 The March Supplement in 2011 underwent a significant change to its imputation procedure so that any non-policy holder in the household can 
now be coded as a dependent on another household member’s plan.  Compared to the old routine, estimates derived from the new one reduced the 
uninsurance rate by 0.5 percentage points (1.5 million people) and increased the rate of any private coverage by 0.5 percentage points (1.7 million 
people)  (Boudreaux and Turner 2011).  Microdata going back to only the 2000 survey (reference year 1999) was re-released under this new 
procedure. 
6 Consistent SIPP data on source of health insurance for dependent individuals is only available from 2001-2011.  Additionally, due to the fact 
that the SIPP is primarily designed as a panel survey, there are significant gaps in the data between the end of one panel and the beginning of the 
next (i.e. 2000, 2008).  As a result, any multi-year placebo time period covering either of these years is incomplete, resulting in fewer potential 
regressions for comparison.  
Furthermore, the 1996 panel does begin until March, and so there is no data for January and February of that year.  Rather than dropping the 
1993-1996, 1994-1997, and 1995-1998 placebo regressions, I include those with the missing months omitted.  The lack of these months should not 
have a differential effect on those in the affected age group compared to the comparison age groups and therefore should not bias the results. 
7As a complement to the SIPP, I also use the basic monthly Current Population Survey for 1994-2011 (Census 2013a, 2013b, 2013c) for 
additional labor supply placebo regressions (see the Online Appendix). The CPS covers every month in the entire sample, and as a result allows for 
several more placebo regressions.  Furthermore, whereas the primary purpose of the SIPP is to quantify numerous outcomes for a longer panel of 
individuals, the basic CPS is designed to quantify labor supply, making it better suited to this analysis. 
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For both data sources, I pool across waves (as in AMS, SK, and Cantor) and also across SIPP 
panels (as in Gruber and Madrian 1997; Ham and Shore-Sheppard 2005; Fujita et al. 2007; and 
Gruber and Simon 2008). I am able to approximately match the results of all three prior papers, 
demonstrating that the only difference between my placebo regressions and their main regression 
is the years used. 
The two data sets produce comparable summary statistics:  
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
While there is a substantial difference in the share of respondents who have ESI in their name, the 
other health insurance variables (dependent ESI, government health insurance, and overall 
coverage rates) are comparable. 
Despite this, for health insurance questions, I believe that the SIPP data is superior to the March 
CPS data for the following reasons.  SIPP asks a point in time question referring to the interview 
month.  For example, one question is: 
 
Other than Medicare, Medicaid [State Program Name], or some other public 
program, are you covered by health insurance in this month?...Other than you, who 
else was covered by this plan?8 
 
The March CPS on the other hand asks a retrospective question about the previous year: 
 
A minor downside is that the labor variables have small definitional differences compared to the ones in the SIPP.  These discrepancies, though, 
are orthogonal to the age and time dimensions of my difference-in-differences strategy and so should not affect the comparison of different CPS 





These next questions are about health insurance coverage during the calendar year 
2009. The questions apply to ALL persons of ALL ages.  At any time in 2009, 
(was/were) (you/ anyone in this household) covered by a health insurance plan 
provided through (their/your) current or former employer or union? In addition to 
(name/you) who else in this household was covered by (name’s/your) plan?9 
 
This causes two potential problems: 1) recall bias where the respondent answers as of the 
interview month, and 2) even if there is no recall bias it is unclear when in the reference year 
the respondent is referring to (AMS; Ham and Shore-Sheppard 2005).  For this reason, this 
paper will use the SIPP as its primary source of health insurance data. 
 
III. METHOD 
Primary Placebo Regressions 
The “placebo regressions” in this paper estimate the econometric specifications of the three 
papers mentioned above on earlier time periods (e.g 1993-1997, 1999-2004).  Equation (1) shows 













9See  http://www.census.gov/prod/techdoc/cps/cpsmar10.pdf  
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Here, as below in equation (3), Yigst represents various outcomes for individual i in age range g, 
state s and time t.  η is our coefficient of interest.  Treatg represents a dummy for being in the 
affected age range, which is 19-26, compared to ages 26-34.  Implementt represents a dummy for 
the year the reform came into effect (2010), compared to years 2005-2009.10  Aig and τt represents 
age and year fixed effects respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the household level, as the 
panel structure of the CPS results in each household appearing in two adjacent years. 


















Here, Treatg equals 1 for the affected ages of 19-23 (excluding full-time students) and all those 
aged 24-25 and the comparison are 27-30.  η is again our coefficient of interest.  As above, there 
are year fixed effects. Cantor adds (in Xigst) controls for age (linear in years, not fixed effects), sex, 
race, education, marital status, poverty ratio, student status, lives with parents, self-reported health,  
and a linear time trend. 
Cantor also adds (also in Xigst) numerous controls at the state level.  Most worrisome to him and 
his co-authors are the numerous state mandates implemented before the federal mandate.  
Analogous to the federal mandate difference-in-differences, this specification includes 
StateTreatigs (whether an individual is eligible for the state’s current or future mandate)11 and 
StatePolicyst (whether the mandate is in effect) and their interaction.  Cantor also adds the state-
 
10 I am using March CPS data for reference year 2010 as the affected year to be comparable to SK and Cantor.  This decision does not affect 
the placebo results which use earlier years. 
11 Eligibility requirements and effective dates for state mandates are as described in Cantor et al. (2012a). 
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level unemployment (BLS 2013), the share of workers in self-insured employer insurance and 
share of employers offering health insurance (MEPS 2013a and 2013b) 12, state fixed effects (ζs), 
and state specific time trends.  Finally, due to their comprehensive health care programs, Hawaii 
and Massachusetts are excluded. 














As opposed to SK and Cantor, AMS’s specification is monthly, covering August 2008-November 
2011.  η (for the post-implementation period) is our primary coefficient of interest, as above.  σ is 
also reported, as AMS additionally include Enactt (a dummy for March-September 2010) for when 
the ACA was enacted but not implemented, and its interaction with Treatg (which here is 19-25, in 
comparison to 16-18 and 27-29).  This is to control for any anticipatory changes in employer-
sponsored policies.  For example, a firm whose annual plan year began in this six month period 
might include young adults before it was mandatory to avoid changing twice in the same year. 
Xigst here includes age fixed effects, and dummies for sex, race, marital status, student status and 
a quadratic of household income as a share of federal poverty line.  Student status is crucial as 
students often have access to what is effectively employer sponsored health insurance through 
their university.  AMS also include monthly linear national and state-specific time trends, the 
monthly state unemployment rate (and its interaction with Treatg) and state fixed effects.  
 
12 In the data for each of 1999-2002, MEPS pools approximately 10 of the least populated states.  Therefore, for placebo regressions including 
any of these years, these states are assigned the average value for all of the pooled states as opposed to the respective value for the individual state. 
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Following from the monthly nature of their survey they include calendar month dummies in τt as 
well as year fixed effects.  Standard errors are clustered at the state level.13 
With these specifications, and the two data sources previously used (CPS ASEC and SIPP), I 
am able to replicate the specifications of the three major papers in this literature.   
Alternative specifications and methods 
It is well documented that a vanilla difference-in-differences analysis (even with proper 
clustering of standard errors) can suffer from two sources of Type I error: serial correlation (see 
Bertrand, Duflo, Mullainathan (hereafter BDM) 2004) and intra-group correlation (see Donald and 
Lang (hereafter DL) 2007).  The former is from the concern that including multiple time periods 
in either the pre- or post-implementation period can introduce serial correlation not mitigated for 
by time trends or fixed effects. The latter is the concern there is correlations among observations 
within ages and that this is not mitigated by age fixed effects. 
Both BDM and DL recommend aggregating the data to pre- and post-time periods and age 
groups, respectively, since the effective sample size is much smaller and so the standard errors 
should be larger.  Dinkelman and Ranchhod (2012) combine these two approaches, and so I follow 
their two-stage method as described below. 
First, as in equation (4), regress the outcome variable of interest on individual level controls and 
a fixed effect for each age#period interaction (13 ages x 3 periods = 39 groups).  Period here refers 
to the three time periods in AMS’s specification – before enactment, between enactment and 
implementation, and post implementation.  These fixed effects, Гigt, correspond to the averages of 
 
13 AMS also includes a triple-difference specification, with the third dimension being young adults whose parents do and do not have employer 
sponsored health insurance.  See the Online Appendix for methodology and placebo results. 
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the outcome variable (weighted by sample weights) for each age in each period, adjusted for 
individual characteristics. 
(4)  igststigstigtigst eY ++++= ζτβΓ X  
 
Secondly, take the coefficients on these fixed effects and regress them on the differences-in-
differences coefficients from above, as well as on age fixed effects (since the data is still at the 
















The coefficients of interest (η and σ) will be very similar in magnitude to those from equation (3), 
but the standard errors will be larger to take into account the two sources of correlation. 
An alternate approach to improving difference-in-differences estimates is to create synthetic 
control groups, as outlined in Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003).  The approach recognizes that 
including those aged 16-18 and 27-29 in roughly equal weights as comparison groups for those 
aged 19-25 is not an ideal strategy.  Instead, for each of the seven ages in the affected population, 
I construct a comparison group from a weighted average of the other age groups.  This increasing 
emphasis on the groups that are more similar should hopefully reduce placebo results from 
differences in trends due to noncomparability. 
First, I collapse the data to averages by ages for the pre-enactment period (weighted by sample 
weights).  Then for each age (a) in each placebo period (p), I minimize the following error function: 
 (6)  )()(min 0101 appapapappapap WXXVWXXW −′−  
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Wap is a period and affected age specific vector of weights for the comparison ages. X is a vector 
of relevant non-health insurance variables that differ across these ages: share married, student, 
employed, unemployed, and working full time, as well as average hours worked and household 
federal poverty ratio.  X1ap is for the age to be matched, whereas X0p is for all of the comparison 
ages.  Vap is a normalizing diagonal matrix with the inverse square of each element in X1ap on the 
diagonal. 
With the Wap vectors for each age in each placebo period I constructed a synthetic age for each 
affected age for each month of data.  The weights are intuitive: age 19 is ~90% age 18 and ~10% 
age 27 whereas age 25 is ~90% age 27 and ~10% age 18.  Ages 20 and 24 are closer to an 80/20 
mix of ages 18 and 27, and ages 21-23 are more equal mixes, sometimes with data from ages 28 
and occasionally even 29 included.  This method uses almost none of ages 16 and 17 as they are 
mostly incomparable to any of ages 19-25. 
The actual and synthetic ages are run through equation (3) at the age-month level, with age fixed 
effects common to each synthetic and actual age.  Individual controls are excluded since they were 
already incorporated into the weighing optimization, as our state fixed effects and trends which 
should average out at this level of aggregation. 
IV. RESULTS 
The results below are as follows.  First are the results of placebo regressions on the three early 
literature papers, where all statistically significant outcomes are not robust to placebo results.  
Second is evidence that the results are also not robust to the two different methodological 
adjustments outlined above.  Finally, this paper presents robust results for substantial robust 
parental and overall health insurance coverage increases using reduced age bandwidths and a 
supporting Monte Carlo analysis. 
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Primary Placebo Results 
Figures 3 and 4 are analogous to Figures 1 and 2 above, except here they are showing health 
insurance outcomes. 
[Insert Figure 3 Here] 
Figure 3 graphs the share of individuals with parental dependent employer sponsored coverage, 
starting in 2001 due to a change in the interview questions.  While the lines crossing on the right 
side of the graph suggests some impact of the ACA’s parental mandate, there are still numerous 
areas pre-enactment where the trends are not parallel. The corresponding F-stats for the period up 
to enactment (i.e., through February 2010) are 2.8*** (p<0.0001) at the month level and 6.56*** 
(p<0.0001) at the quarter level. 
[Insert Figure 4 Here] 
Figure 4 graphs overall coverage rates.  As in Figure 3, while there is plausibly a major effect 
after enactment, there are still several non-parallel sections during the placebo periods.  The F-
stats (for only 102 months / 32 quarters) since this variable is only available from 2001) are 
2.41*** (p<0.0001) at the month level and 4.55*** (p<0.0001) at the quarter level. 
Turning to the regression results, Table 2 shows an approximate replication of SK’s minimalist 
regression using CPS ASEC data on health insurance outcomes, where each column represents the 
same regression on a different 6-year period.  For example, the last column (colored grey) – which 
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gives approximately the same results as Table 1 in SK – has 2010 as the affected year and 2005-
2009 as the comparison years.14 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
For each of the seven variables tested, there are significant results in a placebo regression, some 
at the 5% or even 1% level.  For example, there is a 1.7 percentage point increase in employer 
provided coverage in one’s own name in 2006 vs. 2001-2005, which is statistically significant at 
the 1% level.  With this number of regressions, some spurious results are expected at the 10% (i.e. 
1 in 10) or even 5% level (i.e. 1 in 20).  Here, though, there are more significant results for them 
all to be false positives.  More likely, they suggest underlying age-group-specific trends in health 
insurance in the “affected” placebo time period.  The average difference between these trends 
would also be measured by SK’s difference-in-differences strategy and so could give a strongly 
significant coefficient in the absence of a policy change. 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
Table 3 shows the same placebo periods using the same data set, but with Cantor’s heavily 
controlled regression and slightly different age buckets (corresponding to Table 3 in Cantor).  As 
above, there are more statistically significant coefficients (4 at the 5% level and 3 at the 10% level) 
than can be reasonably attributed to spurious false positives. 
 
14 As described above, the CPS ASEC data for reference year 2010 is considered “affected” since the respondents were answering questions in 
March 2011 about the previous year and so likely answered with reference to after September 2010 (when the ACA parental insurance mandate 
took effect). 
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The placebo results in Tables 2 and 3 cover a relatively narrow time frame.15 Using the SIPP 
data would allow earlier placebo regressions, as the basic question regarding insurance coverage 
has been consistent for longer.  Below, Table 4 shows placebo regressions using SIPP based on 
AMS’s specification.  Since this source is monthly, the placebo periods all start and end with the 
same months.  For example, the last column in Table 4 (colored grey) — which gives results 
identical to Table 2 in AMS — has November 2008-February 2010 as the comparison time period, 
March-September 2010 as the enactment period, and October 2010-November 2011 as the 
implementation period.  The first column, on the other hand, uses November 1993-February 1995, 
March-September 1995, and October 1995-November 1996, respectively. 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
For each of the four health insurance variables studied here, there are significant results in 
placebo time periods.  For example, while AMS found a 3.2 percentage point increase in coverage 
(i.e. the extensive margin), there is 2.3 percentage point increase in 2006-2007 vs. 2004-2006 and 
a 2.4 percentage point decrease in 1996-1997 vs. 1994-1996, all significant at the 1% level.  The 
other variables also have multiple statistically significant results at that level (e.g. a 3.2 percentage 
point decrease in own employer coverage in 2004-2005 vs. 2002-2004), despite the fact that the 
respective questions were not even asked in their current form until 2001 and so only four placebo 
regressions are possible.  Even so, the number of significant results and the fact that several are 
significant at the 1% level suggest that there are other economic factors measured by this 
specification. 
 
15 As described above, the March CPS was significantly revised in 2010 and only 1999-2009 data was updated to this new procedure, and so 
placebo regressions with earlier microdata would not be comparable. 
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There are many possible stories that can be told to explain the placebo results.  For example, 
consider the events of 2006, compared to the years before.  The annual unemployment rate was at 
a local minimum, with a much greater drop in the previous years for those age 20-24 (10% in 2003 
to 8.2% in 2006) than those age 30-34 (5.5% to 4.2%) (BLS).  An improving labor should increase 
the number of individuals employed and with their own benefits, and this increase should be larger 
for younger ages whose unemployment rate had fallen more.  Indeed, in this period, SK find a 
strongly significant increase in insurance from one’s own employer policy, Cantor finds an 
increase in private-self or spouse coverage and a decrease in private non-spouse dependent 
coverage, and AMS find a drop in parental dependent employer coverage, and increase in employer 
own coverage, and an overall increase in coverage (see 2004-2007 placebo period). 
This story about differential trends in unemployment can be used to try to estimate the direction 
of the bias in the main estimates.  In 2010-2011 the unemployment rate was at a local maximum, 
analogous to 2003-2004, albeit at a much greater scale (BLS).  The column that compares 2001-
2003 vs. 2003-2004 finds a statistically significant positive “implementation” effect on parental 
coverage, and a significant negative effect on own coverage, which are directionally consistent 
with the main results.  Subtracting these placebo results from the main results gives smaller 
coefficients, and subtracting them scaled up by the relative sizes of the labor market downtown 
gives coefficients close to zero. A first-order inference from the placebo results would therefore 
be that the main 2008-2010 vs. 2010-2011 results are bias away from zero.16 
 
16 Results from placebo regressions on a triple difference specification, utilizing one’s parents employer sponsored health insurance (ESI) status, 
are consistent with Table 3.  See Online Appendix Table 1, corresponding to Table 5 in AMS.  Here the bias is more difficult to untangle, since the 
placebo results could result from anywhere from one to four pairs of non-parallel trends (i.e., 19-25 with and without parental insurance, 16-18 & 
27-29 with and without parental insurance, different ages with parental insurance, and different ages without parental insurance) and the affect 
group is even more endogenously defined (those 19-25 whose parents have ESI).   These multiple factors could easily explain, for example, why 
in 2001-2003 vs. 2003-2004 the “implementation” coefficient on parental coverage has the same sign as the 2008-2010 vs. 2010-2011 whereas the 
“enactment” coefficient has the opposite sign. 
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One may be concerned this analysis is testing multiple hypotheses simultaneously and therefore 
should adjust the thresholds for statistical significance.  However, even with a very conservative 
Bonferroni correction (as described in Savin 1984), all of the placebo results in Table 4 in the 
2001-2007 period (where all hypothesis can be tested) previously statistically significant at the 1% 
level are still significant.  I can therefore conclude that the strongly significant placebo results are 
not merely due to testing eight correlated hypotheses within each placebo period.17 
One can use both the SIPP and the CPS to study the labor supply consequences of the federal 
mandate, since each survey asks respondents whether they and their household members are 
employed and if so how many hours they work.  This analysis, in particular, of the labor market 
effects builds on the literature of “job lock” (Madrian 1994), which is when an employee who 
otherwise would quit a job does not because the employee would be unable to get the same level 
of benefits at another job (e.g. due to preexisting conditions or the new job being fewer than full-
time hours).  This provision of the ACA severs the link between employment and health insurance 
for young adults, and therefore it is intuitive that it would impact their labor supply decisions. 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
Table 5 shows the results of such a placebo analysis using SIPP, corresponding to Table 7 in 
AMS.  For each of the four labor supply variables studied here (employment, full-time 
employment, hours varying, and hours), there are significant results in placebo time periods.  This 
is especially true in those that compare substantially different labor markets, such as 2002-2004 
compared to 2004-2005.  There are also significant results for full-time employment in 1994-1997 
 
17 Given this result under such a stringent adjustment, there is no need to apply the less conservative methods for multiple hypotheses that are 
detailed in Finkelstein et al. (2012) and Kling and Liebman (2004). 
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and 1995-1998. Even the overall probability of being employed, for which AMS’s regression does 
not show an effect from the ACA, has a significant coefficient in 2001-2004.18 
Alternative specifications and methods 
Table 6 shows the SIPP results from Tables 3 using the Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 
(BDM) and Donald and Lang (DL) method, as described in Dinkelman and Ranchhod.19 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
The coefficients in Table 5 are nearly identical to those in Table 3, which is to be expected given 
the design of this procedure.  The main results for the actual enactment and implementation time 
period persist with most of their original statistical significance.  The significant placebo results 
also remain for any insurance and employer own coverage, though they have largely disappeared 
for parental ESI and individual coverage.  This suggests that while the BDM/DL approach reduces 
some placebo results, it does not eliminate them sufficiently for broad-age group regressions.20 
 [Insert Table 7 Here] 
Table 7 shows the results of applying Abadie and Gardeazabal’s synthetic control method.  
Compared to the regular difference-in-differences results in Table 4, these results have mostly 
comparable coefficients but more, not fewer significant placebo results.  This is potentially due to 
 
18 Comparable placebo regressions on labor outcomes using the basic monthly CPS can be found in Online Appendix Table 2.  The positive 
coefficients on hours worked in the 1990s could be due to the fact that during the economic expansion of the 1990s young adults would be more 
likely to take on more hours than those older (who were already working full time) and those younger (who were mostly still in school).  The 
negative coefficient found during the ACA implementation period could also be the result of young adults’ hours decreasing more than those older 
(who have more entrenched jobs) and those younger (who were already working relatively few hours). 
19 Since these methods ultimately do not solve the statistically significant placebo results problem, I do not also apply them or the one that 
follows to the Cantor and SK regressions using the March CPS.  This is also due to the fact that these methods rely on more precise implementation 
timing than what the annual, backward looking CPS can reasonably accommodate. 
20 Online Appendix Table 3 shows the comparable adjusted labor results, corresponding to Table 4 above. 
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the fact that if that individuals aged 16-18 and 27-29 are not comparable comparisons to 
individuals aged 19-25, then no linear combination of them will make them significantly more 
comparable.21 
Placebo Results Using Reduced Age-Bandwidth 
One strategy for ameliorating the nonparallel trends in the comparison and affected groups is to 
reduce the bandwidth in the age dimensions, analogous to the strategy of Anderson, Dobkin, and 
Gross 2012  Eliminating 16-18 year olds from the analysis (perhaps due to concerns about changes 
in Medicaid eligibility), leaving 19-25 vs. 27-29, is not sufficient to eliminate placebo results (see 
Online Appendix Tables 4 and 5). 
What follows is the same analysis as above, but now only comparing individuals aged 25 to 
those aged 27.  Conceptually, while still a difference-in-differences approach, this has more of the 
intuition of a regression discontinuity design.22  
Repeating the F-tests from above gives much smaller F-statistics, all with p>0.1.23  These stats 
are all much smaller than those for the broad age groups (which are all p<0.0001) and so suggest 
far more comparable pre-treatment trends. 
Tables 8 and 9 below parallel Tables 4 and 5 above, repeating the main difference-in-differences 
regressions.24 
 
21 As the labor supply data was used to calculate the weights for this approach, it will not also be used as a testable regression outcome, and so 
there is no comparable AG table for Table 5. 
22 Unfortunately, what I gain in robustness, I lose in external validity, as the results below are arguably inapplicable to those in the lower ages 
of the original affected group (e.g. 19-23). 
23 F= 0.90 (p=0.8407, employment, month level), 0.90 (p=0.6907, employment, quarter level), 0.77 (p=0.9909) / 0.7100 (p=0.9532) (full time), 
1.00 (p=0.4798) / 1.02 (p=0.4368) (any health insurance), and 1.12 (p=0.1974) / 1.26 (p=0.1494) (dependent employer coverage through parents).    
24 The alternative specifications are not repeated here, since reducing to a two-by-two difference-in-differences regression with 4 observations 
has zero degrees of freedom (see Donald and Lang).  The synthetic control group results are also not repeated as it is inapplicable with only one 
affected age and one comparison age. 
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[Insert Table 8 Here] 
Table 8 is comparable to Table 4, showing the results of placebo regressions on health insurance 
outcomes using SIPP.  This table’s only robust result is that an increase in coverage through 
parental employer sponsored health insurance of 4.5 percentage point is significant at the 1% level 
without any correspondingly statistically significant placebo results.  Given that this result has the 
most direct mechanism to the mandate in the ACA, it is intuitive that it would survive a reduced-
bandwidth falsification test when the other results from the literature would not.  On the other 
hand, the extensive margin (i.e. any source of coverage) implementation effect (3.5 percentage 
points) is only significant at the 10% level, and has an almost identical placebo result for 2005-
2006 vs. 2003-2005.25 
 [Insert Table 9 Here] 
Table 9 parallels Table5, showing placebo results for an age 25 vs. age 27 regression on labor 
outcomes using SIPP data.  Here only a handful of coefficients are statistically significant, none at 
the 1% level, suggesting that estimates of the effect of the ACA on labor outcomes presented in 
the literature are not robust.  This weak result is not due to reduced power from the diminished 
sample size – for example, the magnitude of implementation effect of working full time is only -
0.0003. 
Online Appendix Table 9 parallels Online Appendix Table 2 for CPS labor outcomes.  Here, 
there are statistically significant results for the main 2008-2011 time period, without any 
comparable placebo results, but for different outcomes than those found in the literature (e.g. a -
 
25 Online Appendix Tables 6 and 7 parallel Tables 2 and 3 for SK and Cantor’s March CPS analysis, respectively, whereas Online Appendix 
Table 8 parallels Online Appendix Table 1 for DDD on SIPP Health Insurance.  These results are consistent with those above in Table 8. 
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2.6 percentage point implementation effect (significant at the 1% level) on the probability of being 
employed). These results are more convincing than those of SIPP, since the CPS is designed 
precisely to calculate population employment estimates as opposed to track a variety of variables 
in a longer-panel structure.  The fact that a narrow age bandwidth finds a strongly significant result 
that a broad bandwidth casts further doubt upon the validity of the literature’s broad bandwidth 
approach.26  
Supplemental Results Using Monte Carlo Analysis 
One other way to test the validity of the main results in Table 4 against the statistically significant 
placebo results is to run a Monte Carlo analysis.  Specifically, assume that the implementation 
effect coefficients in the placebo insurance regressions are drawn from a multivariate normal 
distribution, with a mean vector and covariance matrix that can estimated from the (albeit small 
sample) analogs.  Then, with repeated draws from this distribution, one can calculate the 
probability of drawing a coefficient that is father from zero than the actual coefficient. 
The parameters used are in Online Appendix Table 10.  The result of 100,000 simulations is that 
the probabilities of randomly observing a coefficient father from zero than the measured magnitude 
are: any source of coverage (0.0113), parental dependent coverage (0.0007), individually 
purchased insurance in own name (0.1200), and coverage from one’s own employer (0.1419). 
This is entirely consistent with the reduced age bandwidth results in Table 8.  The increase in 
dependent coverage is extremely robust, despite the significant placebo coefficients in Table 4.  
The increase in overall coverage (i.e. the extensive margin) is also likely robust, though with 
 
26 It is also doubtful that this drop in employment could be driving the net increase in coverage for 27 year olds shown in Table 8 (and shown 
to be robust by Monte Carlo Analysis below), as the expected sign would be reversed (i.e., overall coverage decreasing due to a drop in full time 
employment). 
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relatively less confidence.  The other results could have occurred randomly at a greater than 10% 
level. 
V. CONCLUSION  
This paper shows that we should be cautious about using difference-in-differences methods to 
examine the health insurance and labor market effects of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act’s provision that young adults must be able to stay on their parents’ health insurance.  
Several recent papers argue that the ACA caused an increase in health insurance coverage, 
substitution from own to parental coverage, reduction in full-time employment and hours and an 
increase in the probability of having varying hours.  By running placebo regression with both the 
SIPP and the CPS, this paper finds statistically significant results for all health insurance and labor 
outcome variables at various points in time predating the ACA.  Several of these placebo results 
are significant at the 1% percent level, suggesting that they are not Type I errors.  Furthermore, 
they occur both during placebo enactment and implementation phases, which preclude any attempt 
to decompose the results into these two periods. 
Reducing the age bandwidth to only compare 25 year olds to 27 year olds does improve the 
robustness of this approach, though mostly by eliminating the statistical significance of the 
coefficients.  The only result that appears to be extremely robust to placebo regressions, across 
specifications and data sources, is the one with the most direct mechanism: the increase in 
employer sponsored health insurance from one’s parents. 
However, this increase in parental insurance coverage must go somewhere, namely either to an 
increase in overall coverage or a decrease in other types of coverage.  Looking at Table 8 again 
suggests that the majority of this increase (4.5 percentage points) went into the extensive margin 
(3.5 percentage points), even though these results are not statistically significant beyond the 10% 
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level.  As mentioned above, however, there are also statistically insignificant extensive-margin 
placebo results of comparable magnitude (e.g. 3.5 in 2003-2006), casting doubt on the above 
assertion.  Using the Monte Carlo analysis to “break the tie”, we can be reasonably confident that 
the ACA’s parental mandate did at least in part cause this overall increase in insurance coverage. 
This analysis does call into question the robustness of the other second-degree results listed in 
the introduction.  Some of the most recent papers (Barbaresco et al. 2015, Akosa Antwi et al. 2015, 
Depew and Bailey 2015), in part due to the influence of early versions of this paper, do use placebo 
tests or reduced age bandwidths (or both).  Their conclusions of positive impacts on having a usual 
source of care, self-reported health, less delaying care due to cost, increased inpatient admissions, 
and premium increases are therefore likely robust.  But other conclusions regarding out-of-pocket 
costs, use of emergency rooms (uninsured and overall) and increases in dental coverage come from 
papers without either of these robustness checks.  This does not mean that the conclusions are 
necessarily spurious, but I remain less convinced than by the more recent comprehensively tested 
results. 
Going forward, therefore, when studying the impacts of a public policy with a sharp age cutoff, 
it would be more prudent to use a narrower age bandwidth.  If this is impossible due to sample size 
constraints, then a paper should check long-term placebo results, and if needed attempt to improve 
robustness by using the strategies of Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, Donald and Lang, and 
Abadie and Gardeazabal, as well as the Monte Carlo method described above.   
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FIGURE 1 
Share Employed, SIPP 
 
Notes: Each point is the average of itself and 5 months before and after.  Weighted.  Each box is a sample “affected” placebo period where the trends are not parallel.  The vertical line is data from the 
enactment period begins to be including in the moving average window (i.e., October 2009) 
FIGURE 2 
Share Working Full Time, SIPP 
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Notes: Each point is the average of itself and 5 months before and after.  Full time= >30 hours/week.  Weighted.  Each box is a sample “affected” placebo period where the trends are not parallel.  The 
vertical line is data from the enactment period begins to be including in the moving average window (i.e., October 2009) 
FIGURE 3 
Parental Dependent Employer Sponsored Insurance, SIPP 
 34 
 
Notes: Each point is the average of itself and 5 months before and after.  Weighted.  Each box is a sample “affected” placebo period where the trends are not parallel.  The vertical line is data from the 
enactment period begins to be including in the moving average window (i.e., October 2009) 
FIGURE 4 
Health Insurance Coverage from Any Source SIPP 
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Notes: Each point is the average of itself and 5 months before and after.  Weighted.  Each box is a sample “affected” placebo period where the trends are not parallel.  The vertical line is data from the 
enactment period begins to be including in the moving average window (i.e., October 2009) 
TABLE 1 
Summary Statistics for the March CPS and SIPP datasets 
 
 March CPS SIPP 
Number of observations 197,103 296,805 
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Is female 0.49 0.50 
Is black (non Hispanic) 0.14 0.13 
Is Hispanic 0.21 0.13 
Is Married 0.31 0.26 
Has ESI in own name 0.38 0.30 
Has dependent ESI 0.23 0.22 
Has government HI 0.14 0.11 
Has health insurance 0.68 0.71 
Is employed 0.72 0.70 
  






Placebo Regression Results using CPS for Health Insurance Outcomes, Minimal Controls (SK) 
 
       SK Results 
Comparison period starts 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Comparison period ends 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Affected year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 














































































































N 244,491 256,998 253,073 249,789 247,558 247,663 247,370 
 
Notes: Data: pooled from 2000-2012 CPS ASEC (i.e. March Supplement), covering reference years 1999-2011.  The affected sample is those aged 19-25, whereas the comparison sample is 
those aged 26-34.  Includes age and year fixed effects.  Robust standard errors clustered at the household level.  Weighted.  SK’s actual regression highlighted in grey. 
Source: Author’s calculations using CPS and adapted methodology from SK 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level 
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TABLE 3 
Placebo Regression Results using CPS for Health Insurance Outcomes, Maximal Controls (Cantor) 
 
       
Cantor 
Results 
Comparison period starts 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Comparison period ends 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Affected year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 































































N 131,349 137,895 135,764 134,505 133,930 134,435 134,009 
 
Notes: Data: pooled from 2000-2012 CPS ASEC (i.e. March Supplement), covering reference years 1999-2011.  The affected sample is those aged 19-23 who are not full-time students and all 
those aged 24-25, whereas the comparison sample is those aged 27-30.  Hawaii and Massachusetts are excluded.  Includes controls for state policies, age, sex, race, education, marital status, 
poverty ratio, student status, lives with parents, self-reported health,  and state-level unemployment, share of workers in self-insured employer insurance and share of employers offering health 
insurance.  Year and state fixed effects also included, as well as a common and state specific linear time trends.  Weighted.  Cantor et al.’s actual regression highlighted in grey. 
Source: Author’s calculations using CPS and adapted methodology from Cantor et al. 




Placebo Regression Results using SIPP for Health Insurance Outcomes (AMS) 
 
        
AMS 
results 
Start comparison period (August) 1993 1994 1995 1996 2001 2002 2003 2004 2008 
Start enactment period (March) 1995 1996 1997 1998 2003 2004 2005 2006 2010 
Start implementation period (October) 1995 1996 1997 1998 2003 2004 2005 2006 2010 
End implementation period (November) 1996 1997 1998 1999 2004 2005 2006 2007 2011 
Dependent variable          






































































































N 94,526 113,015 128,767 136,873 133,974 146,534 151,933 127,210 150,997 
Notes: Data: pooled waves of the 1993, 1996, 2001, 2004, and 2008 SIPP panels, using only the 4th reference month observations.  The affected sample is those aged 19-25, whereas the 
comparison sample is those aged 16-18 and 27-29.  Includes controls for age, gender, race/ethnicity, marital status, student status, household income as a share of federal poverty line, monthly 
linear national and state-specific time trends, the monthly state unemployment rate, an interaction of the treatment dummy variable and the state unemployment rate, year and calendar month, 
and state fixed effects.  Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level.  Weighted.  AMS’s actual regression highlighted in grey. 
Source: Author’s calculations using SIPP and adapted methodology from AMS. 
a Only available from 2001 panel onwards. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level 
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TABLE 5 
Placebo Regression Results using SIPP for Labor Outcomes (AMS) 
         AMS results 
Start comparison period (August) 1993 1994 1995 1996 2001 2002 2003 2004 2008 
Start enactment period (March) 1995 1996 1997 1998 2003 2004 2005 2006 2010 
Start implementation period (October) 1995 1996 1997 1998 2003 2004 2005 2006 2010 
End implementation period (November) 1996 1997 1998 1999 2004 2005 2006 2007 2011 
Dependent variable          




















































































Probability of having 
hours that varya 
Enactment 































































N (Employed, Full Time, Hours Vary) 94,526 113,015 128,767 136,873 133,974 146,534 151,933 127,210 150,997 
N (Hours, excludes w/ varied hours) 94,526 113,015 128,767 136,873 130,182 139,185 141,629 117,747 137,841 
Notes: Data: pooled waves of the 1993, 1996, 2001, 2004, and 2008 SIPP panels, using only the 4th reference month observations.  The affected sample is those aged 19-25, whereas the 
comparison sample is those aged 16-18 and 27-29.  Includes controls for age, gender, race/ethnicity, marital status, student status, household income as a share of federal poverty line, monthly 
linear national and state-specific time trends, the monthly state unemployment rate, an interaction of the treatment dummy variable and the state unemployment rate, year and calendar month, 
and state fixed effects.  Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level.  Weigthed.  AMS’s actual regression highlighted in grey. 
Source: Author’s calculations using SIPP and adapted methodology from AMS. 
a Only available from 2001 panel onwards. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level 
 41 
TABLE 6 
Placebo Regression Results using SIPP for Health Insurance Outcomes, Using BDM/DL (AMS) 
 
        
AMS 
period 
Start comparison period (August) 1993 1994 1995 1996 2001 2002 2003 2004 2008 
Start enactment period (March) 1995 1996 1997 1998 2003 2004 2005 2006 2010 
Start implementation period (October) 1995 1996 1997 1998 2003 2004 2005 2006 2010 
End implementation period (November) 1996 1997 1998 1999 2004 2005 2006 2007 2011 
Dependent variable          






































































































N (collapsed) 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 
Notes: Data: pooled waves of the 1993, 1996, 2001, 2004, and 2008 SIPP panels, using only the 4th reference month observations.  The affected sample is those aged 19-25, whereas the 
comparison sample is those aged 16-18 and 27-29. First stage (not shown) includes controls for gender, race/ethnicity, marital status, student status, household income as a share of federal 
poverty line, monthly linear national and state-specific time trends, the monthly state unemployment rate, an interaction of the treatment dummy variable and the state unemployment rate, year 
and calendar month, and state fixed effects.  Second stage difference-in-differences at age-time period level includes controls for age.  Weighted.  AMS’s actual regression period highlighted 
in grey. 
Source: Author’s calculations using SIPP and adapted methodology from AMS. 
a Only available from 2001 panel onwards. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level 
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TABLE 7 
Placebo Regression Results using SIPP for Health Insurance Outcomes, Using AG Synthetic Controls (AMS) 
 
        
AMS 
period 
Start comparison period (August) 1993 1994 1995 1996 2001 2002 2003 2004 2008 
Start enactment period (March) 1995 1996 1997 1998 2003 2004 2005 2006 2010 
Start implementation period (October) 1995 1996 1997 1998 2003 2004 2005 2006 2010 
End implementation period (November) 1996 1997 1998 1999 2004 2005 2006 2007 2011 
Dependent variable          






































































































N (collapsed) 532 532 532 532 532 532 532 532 532 
Notes: Data: pooled waves of the 1993, 1996, 2001, 2004, and 2008 SIPP panels, using only the 4th reference month observations.  The affected sample is those aged 19-25, whereas the 
synthetic comparison sample is weighted averages of ages 16-18 and 27-29 matching marital status, student status, household income as a share of federal poverty line, employment, 
unemployment, and full time employment rates.  Includes controls for age, monthly linear national trends and year and calendar month dummies.  Weighted.  AMS’s actual regression period 
highlighted in grey. 
Source: Author’s calculations using SIPP and adapted methodology from AMS. 
a Only available from 2001 panel onwards. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level 
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 TABLE 8 
Placebo Regression Results using SIPP for Health Insurance Outcomes, Reduced Age Bandwidth (AMS) 
 
        
AMS 
period 
Start comparison period (August) 1993 1994 1995 1996 2001 2002 2003 2004 2008 
Start enactment period (March) 1995 1996 1997 1998 2003 2004 2005 2006 2010 
Start implementation period (October) 1995 1996 1997 1998 2003 2004 2005 2006 2010 
End implementation period (November) 1996 1997 1998 1999 2004 2005 2006 2007 2011 
Dependent variable          






































































































N 14,735 17,687 19,980 20,550 19,080 21,146 21,762 18,022 21,616 
Notes: Data: pooled waves of the 1993, 1996, 2001, 2004, and 2008 SIPP panels, using only the 4th reference month observations.  The affected sample is those aged 25, whereas the comparison 
sample is those aged 27.  Includes controls for age, gender, race/ethnicity, marital status, student status, household income as a share of federal poverty line, monthly linear national and state-
specific time trends, the monthly state unemployment rate, an interaction of the treatment dummy variable and the state unemployment rate, year and calendar month, and state fixed effects.  
Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level.  Weighted.  AMS’s actual regression period highlighted in grey. 
Source: Author’s calculations using SIPP and adapted methodology from AMS. 
a Only available from 2001 panel onwards. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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 TABLE 9 
Placebo Regression Results using SIPP for Labor Outcomes, Reduced Age Bandwidth (AMS) 
         AMS period 
Start comparison period (August) 1993 1994 1995 1996 2001 2002 2003 2004 2008 
Start enactment period (March) 1995 1996 1997 1998 2003 2004 2005 2006 2010 
Start implementation period (October) 1995 1996 1997 1998 2003 2004 2005 2006 2010 
End implementation period (November) 1996 1997 1998 1999 2004 2005 2006 2007 2011 
Dependent variable          




















































































Probability of having 
hours that varya 
Enactment 































































N (Employed, Full Time, Hours Vary) 14,735 17,687 19,980 20,550 19,080 21,146 21,762 18,022 21,616 
N (Hours, excludes w/ varied hours) 14,735 17,687 19,980 20,550 18,637 20,246 20,487 16,812 19,759 
Notes: Data: pooled waves of the 1993, 1996, 2001, 2004, and 2008 SIPP panels, using only the 4th reference month observations.  The affected sample is those aged 25, whereas the comparison 
sample is those aged 27.  Includes controls for age, gender, race/ethnicity, marital status, student status, household income as a share of federal poverty line, monthly linear national and state-
specific time trends, the monthly state unemployment rate, an interaction of the treatment dummy variable and the state unemployment rate, year and calendar month, and state fixed effects.  
Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level.  Weighted.  AMS’s actual regression period highlighted in grey. 
Source: Author’s calculations using SIPP and adapted methodology from AMS. 
a Only available from 2001 panel onwards. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
